

UNCLASSIFIED

AD NUMBER	
AD500069	
CLASSIFICATION CHANGES	
TO:	UNCLASSIFIED
FROM:	CONFIDENTIAL
LIMITATION CHANGES	
TO: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Document partially illegible.	
FROM: Distribution authorized to U.S. Gov't. agencies and their contractors; Administrative/Operational Use; 11 NOV 1968. Other requests shall be referred to Office of the Adjutant General (Army), Washington, DC 20310. Document partially illegible.	
AUTHORITY	
AGO D/A ltr, 29 Apr 1980; AGO D/A ltr, 29 Apr 1980	

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS REPORT HAS BEEN DELIMITED  
AND CLEARED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE  
UNDER DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.20 AND  
NO RESTRICTIONS ARE IMPOSED UPON  
ITS USE AND DISCLOSURE,

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE;  
DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED,

BEST COPY  
AVAILABLE



**CONFIDENTIAL**

**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY**  
**OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL**  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

IN REPLY REFER TO

AGAM-P (M) (10 Feb 69)

FOR OT UT 684104

24 February 1969

**SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 145th Combat Aviation Battalion, Period Ending 31 October 1968 (U)**

**SEE DISTRIBUTION**

"This document contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U. S. C., Section 793 and 794. Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner is prohibited by law."

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.
2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

**BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:**

*Kenneth G. Wickham*

KENNETH G. WICKHAM  
Major General, USA  
The Adjutant General

1 Incl  
as

**DISTRIBUTION:**

**Commanding Generals**

US Continental Army Command  
US Army Combat Developments Command

**Commandants**

US Army War College  
US Army Command and General Staff College  
US Army Air Defense School  
US Army Armor School  
US Army Field Artillery School  
US Army Aviation School  
US Army Engineer School  
US Army Infantry School  
US Army Chemical School

**D D C**  
MAR 14 1969

**Regraded unclassified when separated  
from classified inclosure.**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

AD 500069

**DISTRIBUTION (Cont'd)**

- US Army Intelligence School
- US Army Missile and Munitions School
- US Army Ordnance School
- US Army Signal School
- US Army Southeastern Signal School
- US Army Special Warfare School
- US Army Transportation School

**Copies furnished:**

- Office, Chief of Staff, US Army
- Deputy Chiefs of Staff
- Chief of Engineers
- Chief of Research and Development
- Assistant Chiefs of Staff
- The Surgeon General
- OSD(SA), Assistant for Southeast Asia Forces
- Deputy Chief of Staff, Air Force, Plans and Operations
- Director, Weapons Systems Evaluation Group
- Defense Documentation Center
- Security Officer, Hudson Institute
- Joint Action Control Office
- Commanding Generals
  - US Army Weapons Command
  - US Army Flight Training Center
- Commanding Officers
  - US Army Limited War Laboratory
  - US Army Logistics, Doctrine Systems & Readiness Agency
  - US Army Aviation Test Activity
  - 145th Combat Aviation Battalion

**CONFIDENTIAL**

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS, 145TH COMBAT AVIATION BATTALION  
APO San Francisco 96227

AVGC-CC

11 November 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 145th Combat Aviation Battalion for  
period ending 31 October (PCS CSFOR-65) (RI) (U) (UIC:  
WCYNAA)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. (C) Section 1. Operations: Significant Activities

a. The mission of this battalion has not changed during this reporting period.

b. Organization

(1) The 324th Airfield Support Detachment was attached to Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 145th Combat Aviation Battalion on 1 August 1968.

(2) The Organization of the 145th Combat Aviation Battalion during this reporting period included the following units, located as indicated. (See Incl 1)

c. Significant personnel changes during the reporting period were as follows:

(1) Commanding Officer, 145th Combat Aviation Battalion

No Change

(2) Battalion Executive Officer 11 Aug 68

Outgoing: Major Edmund L Fuchs 01936032

Incoming: Major James I Ransbotham 04033560

(3) Battalion S-1/Adjutant 17 Sep 68

Outgoing: Cpt William E Bannister 05320641

Incoming: Cpt Michael J Jett 05332614

Battalion S-1/Adjutant 8 Oct 68

Outgoing: Cpt Michael J Jett 05332614

Incoming: Cpt John D Hoskinson 05330166

(4) Battalion S-2 1 Sep 68

Outgoing: Major Boyce C McKinney 091928

Incoming: Cpt Larry R Page 05318557

FOR OTUT  
654104  
INCL 1

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.  
DOD DNR 5200.10

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

(5) Battalion S-3 1 Sep 68

Outgoing: Major David E Hagler 04010457  
Incoming: Major Giffen A Marr OF105749

(6) Battalion S-4 11 Aug 68

Outgoing: Major Charles R Mix 04005918  
Incoming: Major Emmett R Conrow 02291837

(7) Commanding Officer, 68th Assault Helicopter Company 24 Sep 68

Outgoing: LTC Billy G Sims 089607  
Incoming: Major Richard S Daum 090745

(8) Executive Officer, 68th Assault Helicopter Company 1 Nov 68

Outgoing: Major Richard S Daum 090745  
Incoming: CPT Geoffrey R Webster 05233880

(9) Executive Officer, 118th Assault Helicopter Company 6 Sep 68

Outgoing: Major Robert G Shain 087369  
Incoming: Major Bobby L Moore OF103880

(10) Commanding Officer, 135th Assault Helicopter Company 14 Oct 68

Outgoing: LTC Robert E L Osbourn 04011634  
Incoming: Major Paul E Raetz 095088

(11) Executive Officer, 135th Assault Helicopter Company 1 Oct 68

Outgoing: LCDR Neil Ralph RAN 0949  
Incoming: LCDR Graham R Rohrshiem RAN 01516

(12) Commanding Officer, 190th Assault Helicopter Company 2 Aug 68

Outgoing: Major Charles U Vaughn 082302  
Incoming: Major Charles R Byrd 085962

(13) Executive Officer, 190th Assault Helicopter Company 2 Aug 68

Outgoing: Major James R Boyd 085917  
Incoming: Major John A Lasch III OF105731

(14) Commanding Officer, 334th Armed Helicopter Company 28 Sep 68

Outgoing: Major Joel J Mikuta 074394  
Incoming: Major Charles A Edwards 085158

(15) Executive Officer, 334th Armed Helicopter Company 28 Sep 68

Outgoing: Major Russell A Bronson 074394  
Incoming: CPT Stanley C Slusarz 05420497

**CONFIDENTIAL**

INCL 1

**CONFIDENTIAL**

Executive Officer, 334th Armed Helicopter Company 10 Oct 68

Outgoing: CPT Stanley C Sluexarz 05420497

Incoming: Major Sammy L Childs 04075777

## d. Unit Strengths as of 31 Oct 68

## (1) Military:

Subordinate Unit	Officer		WO		EM		TOTAL	
	Auth	O/H	Auth	O/H	Auth	O/H	Auth	O/H
68th AHC	17	17	53	43	229	207	299	267
118th AHC	17	19	53	40	229	194	299	253
135th AHC	17	15	54	44	244	199	315	258
190th AHC	16	20	53	39	220	198	289	257
334th AHC	31	14	26	38	217	194	274	246
HHD	27	26	11	9	151	171	189	206
145th CAB	125	111	250	213	1290	1163	1665	1487

## (2) Civilian:

Subordinate Unit	DAC		VN		TCN		Contractor	
	Auth	O/H	Auth	O/H	Auth	O/H	Auth	O/H
68th AHC	0	0	21	21	0	0	0	0
118th AHC	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0
135th AHC	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
190th AHC	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0
334th AHC	0	0	13	13	0	0	0	0
HHD	0	0	14	14	0	0	0	0
145th CAB	0	0	50	50	0	0	0	0

## PERSONNEL (ENLISTED) GAINS AND LOSSES FOR AUGUST, SEPTEMBER AND OCTOBER

Unit	AUG		SEP		OCT	
	Gain	Loss	Gain	Loss	Gain	Loss
68th AHC	12	15	12	28	24	19
391st	7	6	10	5	6	5
282nd	0	0	0	0	0	0
118th AHC	16	19	15	23	13	14
573rd	4	12	13	3	12	7
198th	1	1	1	2	0	0
135th AHC	14	18	33	51	27	11
614th	9	9	18	15	10	3
68th Sig	0	0	0	2	0	1
87th	0	0	0	1	1	0
197th	1	1	0	1	1	0

**CONFIDENTIAL**



# CONFIDENTIAL

190th AHC	20	32	9	21	15	5
605th	12	9	5	4	8	2
334th AHC	17	11	17	17	29	11
571st	3	8	12	7	8	5
320th	1	0	0	1	0	0
HHD	12	12	11	16	11	12
Scty Plt	4	3	0	3	2	2
430th	1	1	0	1	1	1
520th	0	0	0	1	0	1

e. Aircraft Status as of 31 October 1968 (Incl 2)

f. Operational Results as of 31 October 1968 (Incl 3)

g. Awards and Decorations: The following awards were received by members of the battalion during the period 1 August 1968 through 31 October 1968.

## AWARDS

## NUMBER RECEIVED

LM	1
SS	14
DFC	47
BS "V"	8
BS	46
AM "V"	83
AM	2648
ACM "V"	14
ACM	63
PH	30

h. (C) Intelligence Situation

During early August the enemy forces in the III Corps Tactical Zone generally avoided contact and attempted to resupply and reorganize his assets for a new offensive which was eventually to begin approximately 25 August. It was obvious almost from the beginning that there was going to be a major change in the VC/NVA strategy in this offensive. In previous offensives the enemy drives were characterized by attempts to move major forces directly against the capital and other major population centers. In this offensive the enemy struck at the outlying provinces, concentrating his efforts in the Tay Ninh, Katum, and Loc Ninh areas. It is believed that his reason for doing this was to draw forces away from the capital military district (CMD) so that forces positioned in the Angel's Wing and Parrot's Beak area of Cambodia could have relatively free movement into Saigon through the southern approaches to the city. Captured documents and POW's also pointed to a secondary mission for the enemy forces operating in the Tay Ninh area and that was to cause as much damage to the 25th US Division's combat effectiveness

CONFIDENTIAL



## CONFIDENTIAL

as possible while practicing for the first time large scale economy of force measures. The VC/NVA forces launched three multi-battalion sized attacks against Tay Ninh City, two of which succeeded in occupying portions of the city for short periods of time without accomplishing their objective of sufficiently weakening the forces in the CND to insure a successful offensive. As a result of his failure, he again pulled back into his base areas to reorganize and resupply his forces.

Since early September the enemy has continued to avoid contact and is believed to be preparing for yet another offensive which is to be initiated at some future date. In the meantime the enemy is expected to continue with increased emphasis on terrorist, sapper, and stand off type attacks against major targets while conducting heavy attacks against lightly defended targets to provide his recent replacements with a source of excellent combat training.

### 1. Operations

#### (1) Combat Operations

This battalion continues to be committed daily to tasks varying from combat support missions to battalion sized combat assault operations; with the emphasis being placed on company sized combat assault operations. The battalion is normally committed daily for three combat assault companies, one general support helicopter company, and a variety of armed helicopter missions, including three firefly teams from the 334th Armed Helicopter Company. The normal mission profile for the combat assault helicopter is ten UH-1D lift helicopters, one command and control helicopter, one maintenance helicopter, one smoke helicopter, and four armed helicopters from the unit's assets. In addition spare aircraft are taken if they are available.

#### (2) Counter Mortar:

(a) The Bien Hoa Air Base was subject to enemy rocket/mortar attacks on nine occasions on five dates during this reporting period. These attacks occurred as shown below.

<u>TIME/DATE</u>	<u>NUMBER OF ROUNDS</u>	<u>DAMAGE TO BATTALION AREA</u>
010022 Aug	12 Rds 122mm Rkt	0
063022 Aug	4 Rds 122mm Rkt	0
230025 Aug	17 Rds 122mm Rkt	0
225830 Aug	11 Rds 122mm Rkt	0
030008 Sep	1 Rd 107mm Rkt	0
060208 Sep	4 Rds 107mm Rkt	0
062608 Sep	3 Rds 107mm Rkt	0
085508 Sep	2 Rds 107mm Rkt	0
232526 Oct	10 Rds 107mm Rkt	0

(b) During this reporting period the 145th Combat Aviation Battalion retained the responsibility of primary command and control

CONFIDENTIAL

## CONFIDENTIAL

of all armed helicopter light fireteams utilized in support of OPLAN Checkmate. A Command & Control helicopter has been flown nightly by members of this battalion and the hours have been expanded from 2300-0400 to 2100-0600 in support of this operation.

### J. Training

#### (1) Mandatory Training

(a) Mandatory Training as outlined in USARV Regulation 350-1 and 12th Combat Aviation Group Regulation 350-1 is being conducted by all units in this battalion. During this reporting period a replacement program was set up to utilize the facilities of the Screaming Eagle Replacement Training School of the 101st Airborne Division. The program of instruction in use by the 101st Airborne Division has been modified to reduce the loss of operational manhours incurred. Their six day training schedule has been reduced to two and one-half days per man by rescheduling classes to avoid blocks of instruction that are required only by 101st Division regulations. This program seems to be beneficial in that it gives both the division troops and the aviation troops a chance to learn mutual respect for the others job. A supplementary training program being developed to provide the required training when the division training load is too great to permit the school to accommodate non-divisional replacements.

(b) The lack of a suitable CBR training site in the Bien Hoa/Long Binh area continues to preclude effective CBR training.

#### (2) Assigned Training Tasks

(a) During this reporting period six VNF aviators (three Staff Officers and three VNAF pilots) were awarded a certificate of graduation upon completion of transition training in the UH-1D. In addition, two staff officer aviators and four operational aviators are presently undergoing this type of training with the assault helicopter companies of this battalion. The staff officers are trained for a period of approximately three weeks while the operational aviators remain with the battalion for a period of approximately three months. Upon completion of the transition phase of their training they remain with the units that trained them and fly the daily missions with that unit.

(b) The battalion has received six allocations to the Navy's Jungle Environmental Survival Training School and three allocations to the Air Force Jungle Survival School. All assigned quotas have been filled and distributed among the units with the emphasis on giving each unit as many school qualified personnel in this field as possible. The battalion favors slightly the crews that are assigned to firefly duty because it is felt that they are the ones most likely to be faced with a survival situation.

(c) In-Country training and orientation for newly assigned senior officers continues to be done in this battalion. These officers normally

## CONFIDENTIAL

stay from two to three days. During that period, they are afforded the opportunity to participate in the various types of missions flown by this battalion.

### (3) Physical Security

The physical security plan has been revised during this reporting period to incorporate numerous changes that were made to the original plan. The plan remains under constant review and changes are made as necessary to improve the overall security of the battalion. During this reporting period a lighting system has been installed around the aircraft revetment area. Some of the units have also installed one or two lights in each aircraft revetment to help detect the presence of sappers during the hours of darkness and this has also proved to be useful to crews performing night maintenance on aircraft. The aircraft revetment area has also been surrounded with a system of eighteen two-man bunkers which are manned during any increased threat to this battalion and are the battalion's primary defense against sappers who may have managed to penetrate the airbase perimeter under the cover of darkness and/or rocket/mortar attack. It has also proven beneficial to equip the five bunkers which are utilized in the defense of the battalion's sector of the Bien Hoa Air Base perimeter with AN/PRC-25 radios to allow them to communicate with the battalion commander when he is mobile and also to provide the bunkers with a means to contact the firefly aircraft that check the perimeter as required.

### k. Signal

(1) During the period the subordinate units of company level completed the necessary transactions to establish their own COMSEC (Crypto) accounts - including the preparation of the CRYPTO facility. COMSEC equipment was requisitioned and received by each account, and FM Voice Secure (FM) was established in the battalion, to include a 24-hour FM Secure/Command Net.

(2) Telephone service to all units and sections of the battalion was improved with the installation of a more versatile switchboard system (employing two SB-868s), with primary problem areas being in the disruption of the lines themselves by heavy earth moving equipment brought in by engineers for area improvement. This heavy equipment also destroyed a 25-pair Air Force cable, and knocked out many class "A" or "C" subscribers in the battalion area. Due to a reduced repair force which lacked sufficient teams of repairmen to provide quicker service for priority designator subscribers, there was a serious interruption of phone service to the battalion.

(3) Battalion perimeter security was improved by employing a primary wire system to the battalion S-2, backed up by AN/PRC-25 radios in contact with the Battalion Operations Center (BOC). The system was reversed after some experimentation, and the AN/PRC-25s were employed as the primary means of communication, and were backed up by the wire lines to S-2.

CONFIDENTIAL

## 1. Logistics

**CONFIDENTIAL**

(1) Class III: Fuel consumption rate of the AALA refueling point at Ham Tan increased from 3000 gallons to 4000 gallons of JP-4 per week during this reporting period. This 25% increase is due to an increase of airmobile operations being conducted in the Ham Tan area. A weekly flight has been coordinated with the 528th Quartermaster Company to resupply fuel to the AALA as necessary. An operational load of 10,000 gallons of JP-4 is currently maintained at this location.

(2) Class V: Additional guide-line figures have been received from Headquarters, 12th Combat Aviation Group to be used in computing battalion basic load and storage levels and are being maintained accordingly. This change incorporates the basic load of each unit with the currently authorized operational load and allows for better management of the amount of ammunition at the battalion ammunition point. The new warheads XM-229 (17.5 lbs) and the proximity fuze (XM-429) are now authorized for operational use, and are being stocked at the ammunition point. Beginning next quarter, ammunition will be requisitioned and distributed on the basis of 40% M-229 and 60% M-151. It is anticipated that 10 to 15% of the M-151's will be equipped with the XM-429 proximity fuze.

(3) Construction: New vertical construction completed during this reporting period consisted of two wooden buildings 20' x 100'. These buildings will be used as flight platoon standby and equipment storage buildings.

(a) The engineers have programed the replacement of 33 aircraft revetments which were originally constructed utilizing CBU containers and sandbags. Estimated completion date at this time is unknown.

(b) During this period two dayrooms and an orderly room were completed under this self-help program. The ammunition supply point has been graded and the ammunition storage point has been relocated.

## 2. Safety

(1) During the period 1 August 1968 through 31 October 1968, the 145th Combat Aviation Battalion experienced four major accidents and four incidents in 43,835 flying hours. This was for a rate of 9.1 per 100,000 flying hours.

(2) The air traffic control, with its full complement of radios is now in operation twenty-four hours a day. Also, to further aid pilots a large wind sock was placed in the southwest portion of the airfield.

(3) Helicopter revetment areas are no longer referred to by individual company names. Instead, every lane has a number painted on each end and pilots request takeoffs and landings to and from a particular lane. This was necessary for two reasons: (a) It is the only method which allows the tower to positively control traffic on the heliport, and (b) pilots, who are not familiar with the field,

**CONFIDENTIAL**



**CONFIDENTIAL**

can easily be directed to any given area.

**n. Flight Standardization**

(1) During this reporting period the primary training and standardization has been focused toward the initial in-country orientation and the making of new IP/SIP. This training is accomplished as much as possible at unit level. A training program is in progress at this time to give each unit a minimum of one SIP and three IP's. This should prove beneficial in keeping their training and standardization up to date.

(2) Problems still exist in the availability of qualified, experienced pilots capable of performing instructor and standardization pilot duties. The majority of the replacement aviators are recent flight-school graduates and require in excess of six months to gain sufficient experience to perform these duties. The assignment of more experienced aviators would greatly enhance the effectiveness of a sound flight standardization program.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**2. (C) Section 2. Lessons Learned: Commanders Observation Evaluation and Recommendations**

**a. Personnel: Rotation procedure of Royal Australian Navy Element**

(1) **OBSERVATION:** The Australian personnel rotation was broken into two stages, fifty percent of the change occurred on 10 Sep 68, and the final stage was completed on 15 Oct 68.

(2) **EVALUATION:** The two-phase method of change over was very satisfactory and no decrease in unit capability was observed.

(3) **RECOMMENDATION:** That this method of rotation continue to be employed by the Australian contingent in the future.

**b. Operations:**

**(1) AH-1G Support at Night**

(a) **OBSERVATION:** When flown at night either in support of ground elements or on the firefly mission, the AH-1G offers many advantages over the older and slower UH-1C gunship.

(b) **EVALUATION:** As a replacement for the UH-1D (high ship) on firefly the increased visibility from the front seat enables the mission commander to better observe the other members of his team. It also offers a better station for navigation and target acquisition. When used in the low ship mode of the fire team, it is again flown in a similar manner as the UH-1C gunship. It is flown at airspeeds which vary from 20 knots to 100 knots with altitudes ranging from tree top to 400 feet absolute. With its ability to carry a combination of different weapons it is a far more versatile aircraft. In the mini-hog or heavy-hog configuration it has the added capability of carrying both the 17 lb rockets for reinforced structures or sampans and 10 lbs rockets with the proximity fuzes for personnel in the open. Its increased power available to the pilot makes the Cobra more maneuverable at lower speeds. The only problems encountered when using the Cobra at night are the unreliability of the attitude indicator and the reflections on the canopy from the gunners instrument panel. It has been found that turning the gunner's instrument lights off and the pilots lights down to the lowest possible level will reduce the glare to a satisfactory level.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** That the AH-1G Cobra be used more in night operations, both in support of ground forces and on the firefly mission. That all pilots be advised of the problems encountered when flying the Cobra at night and the steps discussed above for eliminating them.

**(2) In-Between Post Flights**

(a) **OBSERVATION:** Post flight inspections during the day will aid in detection of potential hazards.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

## **CONFIDENTIAL**

(b) **EVALUATION:** During an operational day, assault helicopter companies shutdown several times between insertions, extractions, and repositioning of ground troops. During these shut down periods a thorough "in-between" post flight should be conducted. When carried out properly they can detect potential hazards such as clogged barrier filters, loose bearings of control sleeves, low or empty oil levels. One or more transmission inspection panels should be pulled, and with the crew observing in the hell hole and through the inspection port, the aircraft should be run to flight idle.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** That all units carry out post flight inspections during the day when the situation permits.

### **(3) Jettison Devices for 2.75" FFAR Pods**

(a) **OBSERVATION:** During this wet season, units of this battalion have experienced numerous rocket pod jettison failures, both electrical and mechanical.

(b) **EVALUATION:** Due to the unusually wet and humid seasons here, a thorough and daily inspection of the rocket pod jettison is necessary to insure proper operation of these devices under emergency conditions. A thorough inspection can detect binding in the mechanical devices and frayed or worn wires on the electrical devices.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** That all units have their armed platoon pilots conduct thorough and daily inspections of rocket pod jettison equipment.

### **(4) Crew Chief and Gunner Seat placement in UH-1C**

(a) **OBSERVATION:** The standard seating arrangement in the UH-1C gunship can be improved by relocating the crew chief's and gunner's seats.

(b) **EVALUATION:** The crew chief and gunner on a UH-1C gunship have a very limited field of vision from the present seat location. They cannot observe to the front clearly due to the pilots seat location and their view to the rear is obstructed by the firewall. They cannot shoot to the front unless they lean outside of the aircraft. The seats can be moved forward approximately 12 inches and turned at an angle so that the crew members are facing approximately 45 degrees from the front of the aircraft. There are ample tiedown points to secure the seats. From this position they can easily place effective fire anywhere from the front of the aircraft to the rear. They have better observation capabilities and they do not have to lean out of the aircraft as far to see to the rear.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** That all units using UH-1C gunships give consideration to this method of placement of the gunner's and crew chief's seats.

### **(5) Increased Firepower For the Snake Helicopter**

**CONFIDENTIAL**



## **CONFIDENTIAL**

(a) **OBSERVATION:** Standard smoke ship configuration does not provide adequate suppressive firepower.

(b) **EVALUATION:** To be effective the smoke dispensing ship must fly low-level in close proximity to the area that presents the greatest threat to the flight and as a result it is more subject to the effects of enemy groundfire than are the lift ships that are being screened. The M-60's presently utilized provide a small amount of coverage to the sides and rear of the aircraft. Twin mounted M-60 door guns mounted on each side of the aircraft supplemented by a free gun manned by a third gunner equipped with a monkey strap will provide the additional firepower to suppress close to the aircraft. The free gun can move to the door that needs the additional firepower.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** That all units adopt this method of increasing the firepower available to the smoke dispensing helicopters.

### **(6) Use of VT Fuzed Rockets**

(a) **OBSERVATION:** Rockets with the proximity fuze are very effective for LZ preparation, but the restrictions on their use near friendly forces dictates the need for special planning for their use.

(b) **EVALUATION:** VT fuzed rockets cannot be employed close to LZ's while the lift ships are landing. The UH-1C gunship cannot mix its rocket load. This means that if VT rockets are loaded they must normally be employed prior to landing. When the VT is used it should be used as close to touch down as possible in order to achieve maximum shock action. One method of achieving maximum utilization of the VT warhead is to use one rocket ship with XM-159 pods loaded with VT fuzes and three YH-21 equipped aircraft loaded with HE rockets with the super quick fuzes. A LFT with the XM-21 system recones the landing zone and does a limited recon by fire. The second fire team with the rocket ship escorts the lift ships. The LZ is marked initially by the LFT and subsequently by the C&C from altitude. The LFT on the LZ recon pulls out early to join the formation. On long final, the rocket ship moves in front of the formation, salvoing his rockets several pair at a time. With this technique he can cover the LZ. After expending on this rocket run, the rocket ship immediately departs to rapidly re-arm at the closest point. This is normally at the PZ, where rockets are prepositioned. In the mean time the flight is covered by the heavy fireteam loaded with HE rockets.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** This method of employment of rockets has proven highly effective in daily operations and it is recommended that other units give it consideration.

### **(7) Break-Up of Flights Upon Mission Termination**

(a) **OBSERVATION:** Upon completion of a combat assault mission, the flights have been separating into individual aircraft for return flights to their home station.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

## CONFIDENTIAL

(b) EVALUATION: All aviators assigned to the 145th Combat Aviation Battalion are required to maintain a minimum of four (4) hours per month of "hood" time or instrument training. One of the most opportune times to obtain a part of this required training is on the return flight from an operational area to the home station. By following this method of returning, it allows the aviator an opportunity to maintain his proficiency of instrument flying as well as giving him a break from the strain of formation flying. It is felt that this practice provides an increased safety margin by not requiring fatigued aviators to conduct unnecessary formation flight.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Due to the valuable instrument training obtained and the added safety margin gained, it is recommended that all companies practice this method of returning from an operational area. It is further recommended that an interval of at least 2-4 minutes be taken between aircraft, as an added safety precaution while participating in instrument training.

### (8) Utilization of Pathfinders

(a) OBSERVATION: Smooth operation of the PZ's has reaffirmed continued use of our Pathfinders in Airmobile Operations.

(b) EVALUATION: The air mission commander in an airmobile operation should be fully aware that he has the responsibility to the ground commander to deliver and/or extract his troops to and from the designated LZ's in the least amount of time according to the tactical situation. Any delay in a rapid buildup of troops in the LZ or any delay in the extractions can result in unnecessary loss of personnel, or aviation assets. This can only be accomplished if the ground commander has set up the PZ according to procedures used by the aviation unit. Employment of the pathfinder team minimizes any delay encountered in the PZ.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That Pathfinders be used more extensively in airmobile operations. In doing so, the aviation commander is assured the combat operation will be conducted in an efficient manner without the loss of time and unnecessary confusion.

### (9) KY-28/TSEC Equipment

(a) OBSERVATION: When the KY-28 is installed in the UM-1, under the primary MWO which facilitates the employment of the KY-28, there is no provision for F.M. volume control.


(b) EVALUATION: It is necessary to install some means of controlling the F.M. volume of the KY-28, otherwise the volume will be maximum at all times. Thus, at this time, the only possible way to control the volume is with the use of the C-1611. This should be changed so that the potentiometer on the F.M. control head could be utilized for volume control.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** It is recommended that all UH-1 aircraft having the KY-28 installed be modified in accordance with the interim MCO as noted in inclosure #4.

c. Maintenance: None

d. Safety: None



GERALD L. WALDRON  
LTC, A.T.  
Commanding

**CONFIDENTIAL**

AVGC-SC (11 Nov 68) 1st Ind


SUBJECT: Operational Report of 145th Combat Aviation Battalion for  
Period Ending 31 October 1968 (RCS CSFOR-65) (RI) (U)

DA, HEADQUARTERS, 12TH COMBAT AVIATION GROUP, APO 96266 20 November 1968

TO: Commanding General, II Field Force Vietnam, ATTN: AVFBC-RE-H, APO 96266

1. In compliance with AR 525-15 and USARV Regulation 525-15, two copies of subject report are forwarded.
2. This headquarters has reviewed subject report and the following comment is made: Reference paragraph 1 i (2) (a): Date time groups are reversed.
3. Concur with all other comments and recommendations.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

  
ARTHUR M. MOUNTCASTLE  
Captain, Infantry  
Asst Adjutant

CONFIDENTIAL

AVFBC-RE-E (11 Nov 68) 2nd Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 145th Combat Aviation Battalion for  
Period Ending 31 October 1968 (RCS CSFOR - 65) (XI) (U)  
(VIC: WUYHAA)

DA, HQ II FFORCEV, APO San Francisco 96266 4 DEC 1968

THRU: Commanding General, 1st Aviation Brigade, ATTN: AVBA-C, APO 96307

Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DE, APO 96375

Commander-in-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-OT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the  
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. Subject report is forwarded.
2. This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational Report-  
Lessons Learned of the 145th Combat Aviation Battalion, for the period  
ending 31 October 1968, as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



O. B. FORY  
1LT, AGC  
Asst AG



**CONFIDENTIAL**

AVBA-C (11 Nov 68) 3d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 145th Combat Aviation Battalion for Period  
Ending 31 October 1968 (RCS CSFOR-65) (R1) (U) (UIC: WCYNAA)

DA, HEADQUARTERS, 1ST AVIATION BRIGADE, APO 96384


**9 DEC 1968**

THRU: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST  
APO 96375  
Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPCP-OT,  
APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the  
Army, Washington, D.C., 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed this report, considers it to be adequate, and concurs with the contents.
2. (C) The following additional comments are considered pertinent:
  - a. Paragraph 2b(5), page 11. Concur except for the free gun for additional fire power. A free gun which can be moved from door to door becomes a potential hazard in itself, particularly in the heat of battle when the gunner would probably move the loaded weapon through the cockpit. The twin mounted M-60 machine guns should be sufficient for suppressive fire with additional protection provided by an armed helicopter.
  - b. Paragraph 2b(9), page 13. An interim MWO to provide for FM volume control at the C-3835 (FM) Control Head was established. This MWO resulted from the ECOM study and re-design, and subsequent prototype installation in two 145th CAB aircraft.
3. (U) 1 Inclosure, as stated on 2d Indorsement, is in error and should be 4 Inclosures.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

  
JOHN D. MINSELL  
MAJ, AGC  
Assistant Adjutant General

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

AVHGC-DST (11 Nov 68) 4th Ind (C)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 145th Combat Aviation Battalion for period ending 31 October 1968 (RCS CSFOR-65) (R1) (U) (UIC: WCYNAA)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 12 JAN 1969

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,  
APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1968 from Headquarters, 145th Combat Aviation Battalion.

2. (C) Comments follow:

a. (C) Reference item concerning AH-1G support at night, page 10, paragraph 2b(1). Nonconcur. The frequency and technique of employment of the AH-1G in night operations is a tactical decision to be determined by the commander's analysis of the factors of METT. Imposition of a command wide policy would interfere with a commander's flexibility in responding to mission requirements. The current problems of unreliable attitude indicators and reflections on the canopy from bright instrument lights are recognized, and must be emphasized in aviator training at all echelons.

b. (C) Reference item concerning crewchief and gunner seat placement in UH-1C, page 11, paragraph 2b(4). Nonconcur. For safety reasons, all four legs of the seat must be securely inserted into the positive lock studs of the tie down position. This is not possible in the seat placement described in the above evaluation.

c. (C) Reference item concerning firepower for the smoke helicopter, page 11, paragraph 2b(5) and 3d Indorsement, paragraph 2a. Concur with the 3d Indorsement, paragraph 2a. The free gun is considered unsafe to move between stations. Twin gun mounts for each side of the aircraft are not presently in stock, nor have they been flight tested or approved by AMC for use. The XM-39 subsystem (.50 cal) is presently under development for this type fire suppression and should be available in theater by 4th quarter FY 69.

d. (C) Reference item concerning break up of flight upon mission termination, page 12, paragraph 2b(7). Concur. This method of maintaining instrument proficiency while returning from operational areas is compatible with the provisions of USARV Reg 95-25, dated 3 February 1968.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Cy furn:  
HQ 1st Avn Bde  
HQ 145th CAB

  
W. C. ARNTZ  
CPT, AGC  
Assistant Adjutant General

18  
**CONFIDENTIAL**

(5)



GPOP-DT (11 Nov 68) 5th Ind (U)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 145th Cbt Avn Bn for Period Ending  
31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)


HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558

23 JAN 1969

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the  
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorse-  
ments and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:



C. L. SHORTT  
CPT, AGC  
Asst AG

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**HEADQUARTERS, 145TH COMBAT AVIATION BATTALION**

**BIEN HOA, APO 96227**

**HEADQUARTERS & HEADQUARTERS DETACHMENT**

- A. Patient Detachment
- B. Security Platoon
- C. 430th Medical Detachment
- D. 520th Medical Detachment

**68th ASSAULT HELICOPTER COMPANY**

- A. 391st Transportation Detachment
- B. 282d Signal Detachment

**118th ASSAULT HELICOPTER COMPANY**

- A. 573d Transportation Detachment
- B. 198th Signal Detachment

**190th ASSAULT HELICOPTER COMPANY**

- A. 605th Transportation Detachment

**334th ARMED HELICOPTER COMPANY**

- A. 571st Transportation Detachment
- B. 320th Signal Detachment

**HAM TAN, APO 96291**

**87th QUARTERMASTER DETACHMENT**

**BLACKHORSE, APO 96257**

**135th ASSAULT HELICOPTER COMPANY**

- A. 614th Transportation Detachment
- B. 68th Signal Detachment
- C. 197th Medical Detachment

**Inclosure 1**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS, 145TH COMBAT AVIATION BATTALION  
31 October 1968

AIRCRAFT STATUS

SUBORDINATE UNIT	UH-1G		UH-1D		UH-1H		AH-1G		UH-6A		OH-6	
	Auth	O/H	Auth	O/H	Auth	O/H	Auth	O/H	Auth	O/H	Auth	O/H
HEAD, 145th Cbt Avn Bn	0	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	1	1	3	0
68th Aslt Hel Co	8	6	0	18	23	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
391st Trans Det												
118th Aslt Hel Co	8	8	0	17	23	3	0	0	0	0	0	0
573d Trans Det												
135th Aslt Hel Co	8	8	0	0	23	17	0	0	0	0	0	0
614th Trans Det												
190th Aslt Hel Co	8	7	0	19	23	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
605th Trans Det												
334th Armed Hel Co	0	6	0	3	3	0	21	14	0	0	0	0
571st Trans Det												
Coltra Net	0	0	0	0	1	1	7	7	0	0	0	0

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS, 145TH COMBAT AVIATION BATTALION

SUBORDINATE UNITS	HOURS FLOWN	SORTIES FLOWN	TROOPS TRANSPORTED	CARGO (TONS) TRANSPORTED	ENEMY KIA	STRUCTURES DAM	DES	SAMPLERS DAM	DES	AIRCRAFT LOST	DAY
68th Aslt Hel Co	8603	26,392	52,013	121	103	10	26	1	38	2	7
118th Aslt Hel Co	9522	16,897	52,168	149	47	15	37	4	32	4	17
135th Aslt Hel Co	9319	28,910	54,701	206	10	60	54	0	1	2	10
190th Aslt Hel Co	9692	31,429	53,517	244	73	4	37	0	0	0	18
334th Arm Hel Co	4706	5242	719	24	116	67	125	8	661	0	11
C-119A USARV AH-1G Tng Tm	1215	1507	15	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
145th Cbt Avn Bn TOTALS	43,057	110,377	213,118	746	349	156	279	13	732	8	63

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

## **CONFIDENTIAL**

### **INTERIM KY - 28 MODIFICATION**

With the combined efforts of the LSI Team at Bien Hoa, the ECOM personnel at Long Bien, and Signal and Avionics personnel of the 145th Combat Aviation Battalion, the following interim MWO was designed and tested with more than satisfactory results.

1. Check behind pedestal and locate wire RF 451A22 going to TB 20, terminal #2. Cut wire.
2. Locate wire RF 404B22 coming from P2107, Pin JJ. Cut wire.
3. Disconnect wire RF 451B22 from Pin N, P 2107
4. Run end of wire RF 451A22 coming from TB 20, Terminal #2, to P2107, Pin N.
5. Splice other end of wire RF 451A22 going to P2202, Pin F, onto end of RF 451B22 going to P 2107, Pin JJ.
6. Splice end of RF 404B22 coming from J2201, Pin G, to end of RF 451B22 going to J2202, Pin F.
7. Find RF 450B22 coming from P 2107, Pin KK. Cut wire.
8. Connect side of RF 450B22 to Pin KK, P2107 to Pin 2, TB 26.
9. Insulate and tie off other end of RF 450B22.

Inclosure 4

UNCLASSIFIED

Security Classification

## DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA - R &amp; D

(Security classification of title, body of abstract and indexing annotation must be entered when the overall report is classified)

1. ORIGINATING ACTIVITY (Corporate author)		20. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL	
HQ, OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310		21. GROUP 4	
2. REPORT TITLE Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Hq, 145th Combat Aviation Battalion, Period Ending 31 October 1968 (U)			
4. DESCRIPTIVE NOTES (Type of report and inclusive dates) Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Aug to 31 Oct 68			
3. AUTHOR(S) (First name, middle initial, last name) CO, 145th Combat Aviation Battalion			
5. REPORT DATE 11 Nov 68		70. TOTAL NO. OF PAGES 26	71. NO. OF REFS
6. CONTRACT OR GRANT NO.		50. ORIGINATOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S) 584104	
a. PROJECT NO. N/A		55. OTHER REPORT NO(S) (Any other numbers that may be assigned this report)	
c.			
d.			
10. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT			
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES N/A		12. SPONSORING MILITARY ACTIVITY OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310	
13. ABSTRACT			
24			

DD FORM 1473  
1 NOV 68

UNCLASSIFIED

Security Classification